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6.1 Introduction
This paper discusses Chile’s experience with international borrowing
over the last two decades. This period allows us to contrast the Chilean ex-
perience during two recent episodes of capital ﬂows to Latin America: the
late 1970s and the 1990s. The ﬁrst episode ended in disaster for Chile, with
a balance-of-payments and ﬁnancial crisis, and huge costs in terms of out-
put and employment. Unlike those of other countries in the region, the cri-
sis was not caused by ﬁscal imbalances but was triggered by a deteriorat-
ing international environment, a misaligned exchange rate, and a weak
ﬁnancial system. Indeed, it started before Mexico announced that it could
not meet its foreign obligations, which ignited the debt crisis. In many as-
pects the Chilean crisis of the early 1980s resembles the more recent Asian
crises and the so-called twenty-ﬁrst-century crises.
During the second episode of capital inﬂows Chile fared much better,
and managed to avoid the large ﬁnancial collapses that aﬄicted many other
emerging economies during this period. Following the 1980s crisis Chile
experienced a sharp recovery, and between 1990 and 1997 was the recipi-
ent of massive capital inﬂows. During this period, and in order to stem net
inﬂows, avoid a large appreciation, and keep control of monetary policy,
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outﬂows. The most widely cited control was the unremunerated reserve re-
quirement (URR) on capital inﬂows, the encaje.1 Because of the resiliency
of the Chilean economy to the events following the Tequila crisis in Mex-
ico and the Asian-Russian crisis of the late 1990s this policy has received a
lot of attention in both academic and policy circles. Finally, after mount-
ing currency pressures in 1998 and a recession in 1999, capital controls
were eliminated.
The late 1970s and early 1980s provide a good control group against
which to evaluate the ﬁnancial integration and macroeconomic develop-
ments of the Chilean economy during the 1990s. For a start, capital con-
trols on inﬂows were much stricter before the 1982 crisis than during the
1990s. In addition, ﬁnancial regulation requiring banks to match the cur-
rency composition of their income and liabilities to avoid exposure to
exchange rate risk was very similar in 1982 to that in place in the 1990s.
Neither avoided the collapse of the corporate sector, which in turn con-
taminated the ﬁnancial system. Clearly, explanations for the lower vulner-
ability of the Chilean economy must lie beyond capital controls and mis-
match regulation.
In this paper we argue that the resilience of the Chilean economy dur-
ing the 1990s was mainly due to (a) changes in banking regulation that
promoted a solid ﬁnancial system (in particular, changes in regulation
for related lending) and (b) the absence of currency risk guarantees to
the private sector. These in turn induced more prudent indebtedness
policies by corporations, which as a result were well equipped to toler-
ate the exchange rate ﬂuctuations of the late 1990s. We argue in the pa-
per that a rigid exchange rate system contributes to capital inﬂows by re-
ducing the risk of arbitraging existing interest rate diﬀerentials. There
is no evidence that capital controls were able to reduce these inﬂows, al-
though there is evidence that they had a limited eﬀect on the composi-
tion of these ﬂows.
In a nutshell, we conclude that ﬂexibility in exchange rate management
and a sound ﬁnancial system are more important than capital controls in
protecting the economy from external shocks and ﬂuctuations in the avail-
ability of international capital.
There are additional characteristics of Chile’s international borrowing
that are worth examining. One of these is the secondary role played by the
banking sector in intermediating foreign credit. In contrast to other coun-
tries with similar levels of economic development, nonﬁnancial corpora-
tions did most of the international borrowing in Chile during the 1990s. We
do not have arguments to say whether this is a positive or negative devel-
opment. On the one hand, it isolates the ﬁnancial system from ﬁnancial
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1. We use the terms URR and encaje interchangeably.turmoil. On the other hand, it limits the access of smaller ﬁrms to foreign
funds. This second aspect becomes more important in the presence of a
solid ﬁnancial system.
Finally, there is the issue of whether Chile can introduce capital controls
after signing a free trade agreement with the United States. Although there
is some loss of degrees of freedom to apply controls, the option, although
limited, still remains.
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section describes foreign debt
and the international investment position for Chile over the last quarter
century. Section 6.3 discusses the issue of capital controls, focusing on the
eﬀects of the unremunerated reserve requirement, the encaje. We explore a
new issue, namely the composition between ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial
borrowing. We show, from an international perspective, that while capital
controls were in place in Chile the composition of external debt tilted to-
ward the nonﬁnancial sector. Then, section 6.4 follows with a discussion on
banking regulation and international borrowing. As we argue, the ex-
change rate regime is the key, and the eﬀects of exchange rate regimes on
debt inﬂows in the 1990s are discussed in section 6.5, while section 6.6 fo-
cuses on currency mismatches. Section 6.7 discusses the implications for
Chile of the recently signed free trade agreement with the United States.
Finally, section 6.8 analyzes the Chilean experience following the Asian-
Russian crisis, where we dispute the view that Chile had a sudden stop. As
we discuss in the section, Chile had a current account reversal due to an ini-
tially large current account deﬁcit and a negative terms-of-trade shock,
which induced the authorities to follow a very tight monetary policy and a
strong defense of the peso. We conclude that from the capital account point
of view, the reversal was a sudden start of outﬂows rather than a sudden
stop of capital inﬂows. Section 6.9 concludes.
6.2 Stylized Facts
In this section we provide an overview of the evolution of Chilean inter-
national borrowing and capital ﬂows. We start with the early 1980s, as this
period provides a good (or a bad) benchmark against which to evaluate the
evolution of international ﬁnancial integration during the 1990s.
6.2.1 The Evolution of External Debt
Prior to the debt crisis of 1982 Chile’s external debt was approximately
$14 billion, slightly less than 50 percent of gross domestic product (GDP;
ﬁgures 6.1 and 6.2). Then, between 1982 and 1985, external debt grew
moderately in dollar terms, but sharply in terms of GDP, as a result of the
depreciation of the Chilean peso and a large fall in output during the debt
crisis. External debt peaked at 120 percent of GDP in 1986. In the second
half of the 1980s Chile’s external debt remained relatively stable in dollar
International Borrowing, Capital Controls, and the Exchange Rate 243terms, while output growth helped bring the debt-GDP ratio down to 60
percent of GDP by 1989.
As a result of renewed access to international capital markets external
debt went from $21 billion at the beginning of the 1990s to $35 billion in
1999. Most of this growth took place in the second half of the decade. In
recent years, debt has continued to grow in dollar terms, reaching $43
billion in December 2003. Although foreign debt has doubled in dollar
terms since 1990 as a fraction of GDP, it still remains below its 1989 level.
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Fig. 6.1 Chile’s external debt by maturity
Fig. 6.2 Chile’s external debt
Source: Central Bank of Chile.Prior to the debt crisis, most of Chile’s external debt was private (about
60 percent). Following the crisis, and in order to successfully renegotiate
external debt, private debt received public guarantees. In addition, most
new foreign borrowing was done by the public sector. This caused a large
drop in the share of private debt, which bottomed out at 17 percent of to-
tal external debt in 1987. Later, Chile’s return to international ﬁnancial
markets and voluntary lending combined with sound public ﬁnances (the
ﬁscal accounts were in surplus until 1999) drove the share of the private
sector in total external debt up to 84 percent in 2000. Subsequently, as a re-
sult of the slowdown in economic activity and mild ﬁscal deﬁcits, the share
of public debt has increased slightly, rising from 16 percent of the total
stock in 2000 to 20 percent in 2003.
Another characteristic of Chilean private-sector external debt is that
most of it is nonﬁnancial (ﬁgure 6.3)—that is, not intermediated by the do-
mestic ﬁnancial system. Firms borrow directly from abroad, skipping the
domestic ﬁnancial system. Caballero, Cowan, and Kearns (2005) stress this
point when comparing Australia and Chile and their relative resilience to
external shocks. In the case of Australia, banks do most of the foreign bor-
rowing, which is then intermediated to the domestic economy. Accord-
ingly, Caballero, Cowan, and Kearns (2005) argue that international bor-
rowing done by banks allows access to international capital markets to a
broader set of borrowers, which may in turn explain Australia’s diﬀerent
response to the large negative terms-of-trade shocks following the Asian
crisis.
This has not always been the case. In 1975, as Chile began opening to in-
ternational capital markets, private debt was only $786 million. Because of
severe restrictions on foreign borrowing by domestic banks (discussed in
International Borrowing, Capital Controls, and the Exchange Rate 245
Fig. 6.3 Financial and nonﬁnancial private external debtdetail below), only 20 percent of this private debt was ﬁnancial. Restric-
tions on international borrowing for domestic banks were gradually lifted
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and private debt grew massively, es-
pecially banking debt. In 1981 private external debt was close to $10 bil-
lion, two-thirds of which was owed by the banking system.
Foreign borrowing by the domestic banking system and the mismatches
it generated were at the center of the ﬁnancial crisis of 1982. Interestingly,
it was not the banks that were mismatched but their corporate borrowers.
Banks were forced to lend in foreign currency all that they had borrowed
in foreign currency (Edwards and Cox-Edwards 1991). The result was large
dollar-denominated bank debts in the balance sheets of domestic ﬁrms,
many of which operated in the nontradable sector.
6.2.2 The Evolution of the International Investment Position
Chile’s foreign liabilities in 1980 were about $16.5 billion, of which $12.7
billion corresponded to external debt and the rest to foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI; ﬁgure 6.4and table 6.1).2Mostof the liabilities were in the form
of external debt, the standard pattern of capital ﬂows prior to the debt cri-
sis. The composition of foreign liabilities started to change in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, when foreign direct investment started to play a much more
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Fig. 6.4 Foreign liabilities
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
2. The International Monetary Fund separates liabilities into three categories in their in-
ternational investment position statistics: FDI, portfolio, and other investment. Although
most of Chilean external debt is in the “other investment” category, there is also some port-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.important role. While in 1985 total foreign direct investment represented 15
percent of total liabilities, in 1990 its share was up to 34 percent, and cur-
rently it represents 53 percent. External debt, in contrast, has reduced its
importance, falling from close to two-thirds in 1990 to less than half in 2002.
Portfolio investment makes up only 13 percent of total liabilities.
From 1990 to 2002 total external liabilities increased from $31 to $84 bil-
lion. As shown in ﬁgure 6.5, foreign assets also increased signiﬁcantly dur-
ing this period, rising from $16 to $56 billion. As a result, the net position
has grown by considerably less than total foreign liabilities, remaining be-
tween 35 and 45 percent of GDP since 1990. On the other hand, ﬁnancial
integration (measured as the sum of assets and liabilities over GDP) has in-
creased substantially during the 1990s, rising from 140 percent of GDP in
1990 to 206 percent in 2002.
An important development regarding Chile’s international investment
position is the increased relevance of pension funds in international assets.
Pension funds have gradually been allowed to increase the foreign share of
their portfolio, so that currently about 30 percent of total pension funds
are invested abroad (ﬁgure 6.6). Because of the size of the accumulated sav-
ings in the funds—about 50 percent of GDP—this has made a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the composition of the country’s international assets, which
shows up in portfolio investment in the asset section of table 6.1. The logic
for the gradual opening up of investment abroad by pension funds was
twofold. On the one hand, lifting restrictions allowed for greater portfolio
diversiﬁcation. On the other hand, it was initially meant to encourage cap-
ital outﬂows in a period of continuous real exchange rate appreciation.3
248 Kevin Cowan and José De Gregorio
Fig. 6.5 International investment position
3. The exchange rate pressures of the outﬂows of pension funds have been minor, since by
regulation they must have low currency exposure, so that in practice they have been investing
abroad, fully hedging their currency exposure. This is one of the factors behind the develop-
ment of the foreign exchange derivative market in Chile (De Gregorio and Tokman 2004).Although its net international investment position is similar to that of
other emerging markets, Chile is more ﬁnancially integrated (ﬁgure 6.7). In
terms of composition of assets, Chile has more portfolio investment than
other emerging markets, mainly because of the activity of pension funds. It
has also more reserves. In terms of liabilities, the share of FDI in Chile is
one of the largest among emerging markets and high-income economies.
External debt as fraction of GDP is slightly larger than that of emerging
markets and signiﬁcantly less than that of advanced economies. Another
important characteristic of Chile’s recent international borrowing is that
foreign companies owe most external debt. Indeed, in 2002 foreign com-
panies owed 57 percent of total private debt. This shows that degrees of
vulnerability of Chile are much less than those indicated by external debt
ﬁgures.4
6.3 Capital Controls: The Encaje
Following the surge in capital ﬂows to emerging markets in the early
1990s, Chilean authorities imposed controls on capital inﬂows while grad-
ually liberalizing capitaloutﬂows.5The stated purpose of this policy was to
reduce net inﬂows and stem the appreciation of the Chilean peso.
The main instrument used to limit inﬂows, widely discussed in policy
circles, was an unremunerated reserve requirement known as the encaje.
The encaje required that a fraction of the capital inﬂow be deposited in a
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Fig. 6.6 Foreign assets in pension fund portfolios
Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Pension Fund Superintendency (SAFP).
4. For further details see Jadresic et al. (2003).
5. As part of the eﬀort to increase outﬂows, the years required for foreign investors to re-
mit capital and proﬁts were slowly reduced and ﬁnally eliminated. Pension fund limits to in-
vesting abroad were also widened. For details on the main measures taken since 1990 see ap-
pendix A. See also Gallego, Hernández, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999).non-interest-bearing account in the Chilean central bank. The encaje was
introduced in June 1991 and was expanded and extended various times in
the following years. Initially, it was set at 20 percent of the inﬂow, for a pe-
riod from three months to twelve months depending on the maturity and
the nature of the credit. Trade credit was excluded from the encaje.6 Later,
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A
B
Fig. 6.7 Chile’s international assets and liabilities in perspective: A, net investment
position (% GDP); B, foreign assets (% GDP); C, foreign liabilities (% GDP); D,
international ﬁnancial integration (% GDP)
Source: Jadresic et al. (2003)
6. De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés (2000) argue that the encaje gradually lost power, as
markets came up with ways to circumvent it. The most obvious way to overcome the encaje,
frequently cited but not quantiﬁed, was to register short-term credit as trade credit.in 1992 and then in 1995, the base was broadened to include foreign cur-
rency deposits and the proceeds from the issuance of American depository
receipts (ADRs), the rate was increased to 30 percent, and the period was
set at twelve months regardless of the term of the credit. The encajewas re-
duced in 1998 and ﬁnally eliminated in 2001.7
Several reasons were given for introducing the encaje. The most promi-
nent was the need to reduce net capital inﬂows to prevent an appreciation
of the Chilean peso. Indeed, a depreciated real exchange rate was consid-
ered a key factor behind the successful recovery of the economy that had




7. Before its elimination the rate of the reserve requirement was set to zero.taken place since the mid-1980s. In addition, it was argued that capital con-
trols would allow for some degree of monetary policy independence in the
context of a managed exchange rate, which for most of the 1990s was an ex-
change rate band with adjustable width and a crawling central parity (ﬁg-
ure 6.8). Finally, since the cost of the encaje was proportionally higher for
short-term inﬂows, it was argued that it would reduce the vulnerability of
the economy to “hot capital.”
An assessment of the macroeconomic consequences of the encaje re-
quires looking at its eﬀect on interest rates, the level and composition of
capital ﬂows, and the exchange rate.8 We review existing evidence on the
eﬀects of the encaje on all of these variables in this section.
6.3.1 Macroeconomic Eﬀects
Interest Rates
In theory the existence of an encajeshould allow for diﬀerences between
domestic and foreign interest rates without inducing capital ﬂows to re-
store a nonarbitrage condition. Assuming full compliance, and an inter-
national interest rate of 7 percent, a 30 percent encaje for a year leads to a
diﬀerential of about 3 percentage points on a one-year inﬂow. In practice,
however, the impact on interest rates is likely to be considerably smaller, as
agents switch to longer maturities or ﬁnd ways of circumventing the encaje.
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Fig. 6.8 Nominal exchange rate
8. The review of the evidence is mainly focused on De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés
(2000). See also Soto and Valdés-Prieto (1996), Edwards (1999), Gallego, Hernández, and
Schmidt-Hebbel (1999), and Nadal De Simone and Sorsa (1999).What then are the empirical estimates of the eﬀect of the encaje on do-
mestic interest rates? Using a vector autoregression (VAR) framework, De
Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés (2000) found that the eﬀect on the interest
rate was both small and short lived. In the ﬁrst six months after a change
in the encajeregulation—which the authors interpret as closing an existing
loophole—they ﬁnd eﬀects that range between 90 and 150 basis points for
a 30 percent encaje. This eﬀect dies out slowly over a twelve-month hori-
zon. This result lies at the upper range of the estimated eﬀects of the con-
trols on interest rates in Chile. Smaller eﬀects are reported in Edwards
(1999), while Gallego, Hernández, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) found no
eﬀects whatsoever.
Level of Inﬂows
The Chilean economy received massive capital inﬂows during the 1990s,
and there is no solid evidence showing that they would have been substan-
tially larger if the encaje had not been implemented. Indeed, most existing
empirical studies ﬁnd no eﬀects of the encajeon the level of capital inﬂows.
The only exception is a study by Gallego, Hernández, and Schmidt-Hebbel
(1999), who ﬁnd that a 100 basis point increase in the cost of the encaje re-
duces total capital inﬂows by 1 percent of GDP. In addition, they ﬁnd that
those ﬂows directly aﬀected by the encaje would decline by 2 percent of
GDP, which indicates that the composition across maturities of interna-
tional borrowing was aﬀected. It is important to note that this eﬀect is
computed for the stock of foreign liabilities. Given that the total cost of the
encaje, using the estimates of Gallego, Hernández, and Schmidt-Hebbel
(1999), was on average between 100 and 200 basis points, the reserve re-
quirement reduced total inﬂows by at most 2 percent of GDP. This is rela-
tively small, considering that total net inﬂows during the whole period
from 1991 until 1997 were approximately 27 percent of GDP.
Composition of Inﬂows
One would expect that taxing short-term ﬂows more heavily would in-
crease the maturity of capital inﬂows. Indeed, existing evidence shows that
the encaje led to longer-term external debt. As column (1) in table 6.2
shows, in the mid-1990s, as capital controls were tightened, short-term
debt declined sharply as percentage of total debt. According to De Grego-
rio, Edwards, and Valdés (2000), the total eﬀect of the encajeon short-term
debt would have been between 0.5 and 1 percentage points of GDP, which
would have resulted in a lower stock of short-term debt (about $600 mil-
lion).
From a vulnerability perspective it usually makes sense to look at trade
credit separately from other forms of short-term credit, as trade credit con-
sists of advances on exports and is therefore less volatile. In the Chilean case,
however, this distinction may be blurred by the fact that short-term debt was
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column (3) shows the evolution of an expanded deﬁnition of short-term debt
that includes trade credit. Here the eﬀects of the encaje,mentioned above, are
not that clear. Most of the decline in short-term debt takes place between
1997 and 1999, a couple of years after the encaje was tightened.
Exchange Rate
During most of the 1990s, the nominal exchange rate in Chile was al-
lowed to ﬂuctuate within a band. On several occasions the width as well as
the center of the band was adjusted (ﬁgure 6.8). The ﬁrst change was the
widening of the band from  5 percent to  10 percent. Later, in 1997, it
was widened again to  12.5 percent. The center of the band was adjusted
several times; most notably, it was revalued in early 1992, late 1994, and
early 1997. Finally, on the eve of the Asian crisis and due to fear of ﬂoating
(Calvo and Reinhart 2002), the band was narrowed. Several changes ﬁnally
led to the elimination of the band and a move to a ﬂexible exchange rate
regime in December 1999.9
Both the exchange rate policy and the encaje tried to avoid an apprecia-
tion in the context of massive capital inﬂows. Casual observation suggests
that they failed to do so (ﬁgure 6.9). From 1990 until late 1997 the real ex-
change rate appreciated persistently. The most appreciated level occurred
in 1997, a year in which net capital inﬂows, excluding reserves, were 9.1
percent of GDP, accumulation of reserves amounted to 3.3 percent of
GDP, and the encaje was in full application.
Of course, the correct counterfactual is to determine the marginal eﬀect
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Table 6.2 Short-term external debt
Narrow deﬁnition New deﬁnition Debt maturing within a year
US$ millions % total debt US$ millions % total debt US$ millions % total debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1991 2,199 11.3 4,346 22.3 5,658 29.0
1992 3,475 16.3 5,841 27.3 7,239 33.9
1993 3,487 15.9 5,769 26.3 7,353 33.5
1994 3,865 15.6 6,859 27.7 8,541 34.5
1995 3,431 13.5 6,891 27.0 8,636 33.9
1996 2,635 10.0 7,045 26.8 8,862 33.7
1997 1,287 4.4 5,522 19.0 7,829 27.0
1998 1,610 4.9 5,130 15.7 7,672 23.5
1999 1,171 3.4 4,317 12.4 7,145 20.6
2000 2,531 6.8 6,172 16.6 10,236 27.5
2001 2,051 5.3 5,290 13.7 9,944 25.8
2002 2,324 5.7 5,823 14.2 11,591 28.3
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
9. For further details see De Gregorio and Tokman (2004).of the encaje on the real exchange rate. We turn to this next. The ﬁrst em-
pirical study on the eﬀects of the encaje (Soto and Valdés-Prieto 1996), as
well as most subsequent work, has focused on determining whether it was
eﬀective in avoiding an appreciation of the peso. All of the existing studies
mentioned so far in this section—spanning a broad set of measures, peri-
ods, and empirical speciﬁcations—fail to ﬁnd an eﬀect of the encajeon the
path of the real exchange rate.
Financial Vulnerability
In 1998 the Chilean peso suﬀered three rounds of speculative attacks.
These turbulences were fought oﬀ with large hikes in interest rates and mas-
sive intervention in the foreign exchange market. As a result of this interven-
tion and a series of negative external shocks, in 1999 the economy suﬀered its
ﬁrst recession in many years. However, the fall in output was small in com-
parison to other countries that also experienced sudden stops in capital in-
ﬂows in the late 1990s. Furthermore, Chile in 1999 did not face a ﬁnancial cri-
sis. This has led many observers to argue that the presence of the encaje
reduced Chile’s external vulnerability and was central to the mild recession.
After all, it reduced the share of short-term debt, a variable that many authors
have singled out as an important source of ﬁnancial vulnerability.10
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Fig. 6.9 Real exchange rate (1986   100)
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
10. A recent literature, motivated by events in East Asia, has argued that short-term exter-
nal debt may be an important source of macroeconomic vulnerability. Proponents of this view
include Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Chang and Velasco (1999), who argue that excessive re-
liance on short-term debt leaves emerging market corporations vulnerable to “ﬁnancial
panic” as in the stylized model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In this context, policies like
the encaje have the potential to reduce vulnerability by lengthening the tenor of the external
debt contracts.The problem with this view is that the magnitude of the estimated eﬀects
of the encajeon the level and composition of capital ﬂows during the 1990s
makes it hard to believe that capital controls were central to Chile’s eco-
nomic success during the 1990s. Furthermore, Chile’s experience in the
early 1980s shows that, even if capital controls are eﬀective in limiting the
share of short-term debt, this certainly does not provide a guarantee
against currency crises.
The Chilean 1982 crisis was a full-blown twin crisis (currency and ﬁ-
nancial). Starting from a closed capital account, legislation passed early
in 1974 allowed Chilean nonﬁnancial ﬁrms and individuals to borrow
abroad. However, inﬂows were restricted to maturities greater than six
months. In April 1976, concerned with the destabilizing eﬀects of short-
term capital inﬂows, Chilean authorities further lengthened this minimum
maturity to two years. The minimum maturity restriction was to stay in
place up to the debt crisis in 1982. In 1979 an additional restriction on
short-term debt was introduced: a URR (an encaje) was put in place on all
foreign loans shorter than sixty-ﬁve months.11As a result of these stringent
controls, short-term debt in 1981 was only 19 percent of total debt. This did
not prevent a severe crisis, however, with output declines of 13.6 percent in
1982 and 2.8 percent in 1983.12
6.3.2 Microeconomic Eﬀects
The available evidence shows that, at best, the eﬀects of the encaje on
capital inﬂows, interest rates, and the exchange rate are small. Further-
more, the estimated magnitudes and the events of 1982 suggest that it is no
panacea against currency and ﬁnancial crisis. So much for the beneﬁts.
What about the costs?
Diﬀerential Eﬀects across Firm Size
The microeconomic distortions that the encaje introduces are an issue
frequently ignored in the evaluation of capital controls in Chile. If and
when the encaje worked, its main eﬀect was to push the domestic cost of
capital—in particular short-term capital—above its international oppor-
tunity cost. This presumably had diﬀerential eﬀects across ﬁrms depend-
ing on their ability to obtain long-term ﬁnancing abroad. Forbes (2003)
takes this issue to the data by analyzing the investment behavior of publicly
listed companies. She shows that during the period that the encaje pre-
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11. This reserve requirement ranged from 25 percent, for loans shorter than thirty-six
months, to 10 percent for loans between forty-eight and sixty-ﬁve months in maturity. Trade
credit was excluded. See Edwards and Cox-Edwards (1991).
12. One of the reasons behind the collapse was the weakness of corporate-sector balance
sheets to tolerate a massive exchange rate adjustment, which ultimately contaminated a
poorly regulated banking system. We will return to this issue with further details in section
6.6.vailed, smaller ﬁrms faced a higher cost of capital and less investment. She
interprets this as a cost of the encaje.
Although suggestive, we believe that this result must be interpreted cau-
tiously. Although the encaje was clearly a variable that distinguished the
periods analyzed, there are other factors that could also explain the diﬀer-
ences in ﬁrm behavior across size. One of these was restrictions placed on
international bond issuance. During the 1990s, regulations requiring a
minimum size and credit rating for international bond issues eﬀectively ex-
cluded many smaller ﬁrms from the international bond market.13 These
limits were gradually relaxed, so that in 1998 the minimum rating was low-
ered to BBB- and the minimum size reduced to $5 million.
Diﬀerential Eﬀects on the Financial Sector
As mentioned in section 6.2, an interesting characteristic of the Chilean
economy in the 1990s is the direct external indebtedness of corporations,
with domestic banks playing a minor role in intermediating international
debt. To see whether this is Chilean quirk or a feature common to other
emerging economies, we explore whether banks in Chile intermediate a rel-
atively low share of international debt in comparison to other economies
at similar levels of development. To do so we look at the behavior of bank
and nonbank debt inﬂows for a sample of capital-importing countries dur-
ing the 1990s. For each country we calculate the average ratio of bank in-
ﬂows over total debt inﬂows over two periods: 1990–96 and 2000–2003. We
exclude the period 1997–99, as it is a period of substantial changes in the
regulations aﬀecting the Chilean capital account, and also a period of sub-
stantial instability in aggregate capital ﬂows. We then regress the ratio of
bank inﬂows to total debt inﬂows against a broad measure of development,
the log of GDP per capita (purchasing power parity at the beginning of
each period). We also include a dummy for Chile, an interaction of the
Chile dummy with a dummy for the second period, and the second-period
dummy itself.
The results are shown in table 6.3. The basic result of column (1) shows
that the estimated coeﬃcient on the income variable is positive and signif-
icant: banks play a larger role in intermediating capital inﬂows in high-
income economies (which we interpret as countries with more highly de-
veloped ﬁnancial systems). More important, the Chilean dummy is
negative, signiﬁcant, and sizable. The share of bank inﬂows in total debt in-
ﬂows in Chile is 20 percent lower than the level predicted by its income level
in the period 1990–96. This diﬀerence disappears in the latter period, as in-
dicated by the positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the interaction be-
tween the Chile dummy and the second-period dummy. This result is ro-
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13. Corporations required a rating equal to or more than sovereign risk, and the minimum
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.bust to changes in the sample (column [2]), using a direct measure of ﬁ-
nancial development (bank credit over GDP, again at the beginning of
each period, in column [3]) and an alternative measure of capital inﬂows
(columns [4]–[6]).
A possible explanation of this ﬁnding is that closely monitored banks
found it harder to avoid paying the encaje than corporations, so that the
eﬀective cost of foreign credit for banks was higher. If this were the case,
the encaje would have had important distributional eﬀects across ﬁrms.
Small ﬁrms (reliant on short-term bank credit) would have borne the brunt
of the encaje, while large ﬁrms (able to borrow in international markets or
to evade the encaje) would have been relatively unaﬀected.
An alternative explanation is in the recent development of the Chilean
derivatives market. As we mentioned above, Caballero, Cowan, and
Kearns (2005) ﬁnd that in Australia a large share of foreign debt is inter-
mediated by banks. They also ﬁnd that banks lend most of these funds in
Australian dollars and use the derivatives market to hedge their positions.
Indeed, banks in Australia are the largest holders of net currency deriva-
tive positions. This being the case, the development of the Chilean deriva-
tives markets in the last few years is a possible explanation for the increased
role of banks in international debt ﬂows.
Finally, changes in capital account regulations after 1998 (discussed in
the appendix), in particular those changes pertaining to bond issue, may
also have played a part in switching the mix away from direct international
borrowing toward bank-intermediated foreign borrowing. Currently, as a
result of some combination of market development, the consolidation of a
ﬂexible exchange rate regime, and further liberalization of bank borrow-
ing, the composition of Chile’s private external debt is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from what would be predicted according to international pat-
terns.
6.4 Bank Regulations, International Borrowing, and Financial Crises
We show above that banks in Chile during the 1990s intermediated a rel-
atively low share of international debt inﬂows, with most international bor-
rowing done directly by corporations. We also show that in the years after
the capital account was fully liberalized and the exchange rate ﬂoated,
banks have begun playing a signiﬁcantly larger role in debt inﬂows. There
are two opposing views on the beneﬁts and risks of this increased partici-
pation of banks in international capital ﬂows. On the one hand, Caballero,
Cowan, and Kearns (2005) have argued that the larger role that banks in
Australia play in international borrowing vis-à-vis Chilean banks allows
the economy greater resilience to external demand shocks by enhancing
access to international capital, especially to ﬁrms and consumers that do
not have direct access to the international capital markets. The Chilean ex-
International Borrowing, Capital Controls, and the Exchange Rate 259perience in 1982, on the other hand, suggests exactly the opposite: large
foreign liabilities on bank balance sheets can become a source of vulnera-
bility. If currency risk is not correctly managed by the banking system, a
large devaluation can lead to a ﬁnancial crisis.14
We think that both arguments have a case. The optimality of increased
intermediation of capital ﬂows by domestic banks depends crucially on the
incentives banks have for correctly managing aggregate risk—in particu-
lar exchange rate risk—and the tools available for the banks to manage
such risks. Banking regulation and macroeconomic policy both have a di-
rect impact on banks’ incentives to hedge against exchange rate uncer-
tainty. The ability to contract foreign debt in the domestic currency, a well-
developed domestic currency debt market that is liquid and covers a broad
range of maturities, and the development of a derivatives market are all
tools that allow banks to take on foreign debt without necessarily taking
on exchange rate risk.15 In this section we concentrate on the importance
of bank regulation. In the following section we turn our attention to ex-
change rate policy and its eﬀect on debt inﬂows.
Banking regulation has played a key role in determining the size and
nature of capital inﬂows to Chile. As mentioned above, capital controls in
Chile in the early 1980s were more stringent than those in the mid-1990s.
Bank regulation, however, was radically diﬀerent. In what follows of this
section, we look at bank regulation in the early 1980s and argue that it
played an important part in the large capital inﬂows, mostly banking, of
the period and the resulting ﬁnancial crisis.16
Following a period of state control and ﬁnancial repression, a series of
measures thrust the Chilean ﬁnancial system into the free market arena in
the second half of the 1970s. In May 1974 ﬁnancieras(ﬁnance houses) were
authorized to operate and to freely ﬁx interest rates. Commercial banks,
mostly state controlled, still had ﬁxed rates and quantity controls. Then, in
April 1975, banks were allowed to freely determine interest rates. During
this year, over 86 percent of state-owned banks were privatized. Hence, by
the time of full capital account opening in April 1980, Chilean banks had
been operating in a free market system for no more than ﬁve years. In Chile
domestic ﬁnancial liberalization happened before international ﬁnancial
opening, but the former was far from well done, as we discuss below.
Initially there was no explicit deposit insurance in Chile, and authorities
advocated a market-oriented banking system in which depositor monitor-
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14. For recent discussion on the negative aﬀects of international borrowing in the context
of a fragile banking system see Soto (2000).
15. A series of papers addressing the issue of domestic ﬁnancial dollarization have also
made this point. This literature emphasizes the interactions between exchange rate regimes
and bank regulations in determining the share of domestic bank contracts denominated in
foreign currencies. IADB (2005) contains a recent survey.
16. For a recent discussion on the development of the Chilean ﬁnancial market since the
1980s, see Cifuentes, Desormeaux, and Gónzalez (2002).ing would avoid excessive risk taking by banks. However, in December of
1976, a series of ﬁnancieras defaulted on their deposits. This led to the in-
tervention of the Banco Osorno, which was at the center of a large business
group. The government bailed out 100 percent of the deposits of the
troubled ﬁnancieras. In addition, an explicit deposit guarantee of approxi-
mately US$2500 per depositor was put in place. A series of authors have
argued that the bailout of the ﬁnancieras led to the belief that all deposits
would be guaranteed (see Arellano 1983; Velasco 1991; and De la Cuadra
and Valdés-Prieto 1992). There were also oﬃcial statements from authori-
ties that reinforced this idea. This belief would explain why, despite re-
peated problems with banks and ﬁnancieras in the late 1970s, there never
was a substantial run on deposits in Chile (Velasco 1991).
Rules setting prudential constraints on lending and investment portfo-
lios and those forcing the timely disclosure of accurate information evolved
slowly over the period 1975–82. In addition, the government recognized its
limited enforcement capacity, so many rules (in particular those regulating
related lending) were poorly enforced. Early legislation (1975) setting a
maximum individual holding of bank property at 3 percent was discarded
after extensive abuse. As a result, recently privatized banks were purchased
by existing and new grupos (conglomerates). It was only after three large
banks and a series of ﬁnancieras (which together made up 8 percent of de-
posits) went into crisis in late 1981 that limits on related lending were in-
troduced. However, no consideration was made in these limits for ﬁrm
ownership structure, so that binding limits on related lending were really
only introduced in 1982. The result was highly concentrated lending. For
example, Arellano (1983) argues that one of the causes of the Fluxa group
intervention was the high concentration of assets, mostly to related com-
panies (see also Moulian and Vergara 1979).
Evaluating the health of a bank therefore required information not only
on the bank itself but also on the ﬁnancial health of the conglomerate. In-
formation available to depositors was also limited by the slow implemen-
tation of loan risk classiﬁcation rules by regulators. Although the Chilean
Bank Superintendency (SBIF) was authorized to classify loans by risk as
early as January 1978, it did not issue speciﬁc rules for this classiﬁcation
until February 1980 and did not fully enforce classiﬁcation until 1982.
At the same time as cross-ownership and the lack of risk classiﬁcation
mechanisms made private monitoring extremely costly, the growing belief
of full deposit insurance lowered the incentives for this monitoring. Com-
pounding the problem, legislation setting prudential constraints on lend-
ing and investment portfolios evolved slowly and in some cases was weakly
enforced by the government. The presumption was that private monitoring
and legislation classifying managers’ actions as fraud (punishable by
prison terms) were enough to limit excessive risk taking by banks. As ar-
gued by Barandiarán and Hernández (1999), the government was keen for
International Borrowing, Capital Controls, and the Exchange Rate 261the ﬁnancial sector to help reactivate the economy; hence, “rules on col-
lateral were simple and many loans were not properly secured, rules on
non-performing loans and loss provisions were below international stan-
dards, rules for asset classiﬁcation were only implemented gradually.” Cap-
ital adequacy ratios existed (5 percent of liabilities), but their eﬀectiveness
was limited by a weak asset classiﬁcation system.
Another factor that was indicative of the great distress that was incubat-
ing in the ﬁnancial system was the high interest rates, as well as spreads be-
tween lending and borrowing rates. At the time of the liberalization real
loan rates climbed to more than 60 percent, which by 1980 had declined to
12 percent. But as the crisis was emerging, real loan rates increased sharply,
to 39 percent in 1981 and 35 percent in 1982, even with a fully open capi-
tal account. One could think that there could be an overshooting at the
early stages of the ﬁnancial liberalization (De la Cuadra and Valdés-Prieto
1992). Although it is not easy to rationalize the magnitudes in Chile, it is
more diﬃcult to argue that such overshooting was the case in the early
1980s. Nor can one explain the high rates as a peso problem.17 The most
likely factor was the rollover of bad loans made by banks, which was due
to the expected bailout that banks perceived as ﬁnancial fragility was
growing, a problem that was exacerbated by related lending.
All in all, it is not possible to determine how much of the ensuing credit
growth was the result of “excessive” risk taking by banks. What is clear,
however, is that the incentives for risky behavior by banks were present and
that prudential regulation was weak and unable to prevent this conduct.
Legislation had to be modiﬁed continuously as regulators became aware
of highly concentrated lending patterns and risky loans. This was not a
healthy ﬁnancial system that collapsed because of the large external shocks
that hit the economy in the early 1980s: prior to 1983, the country had al-
ready seen two episodes of substantial banking distress.
The ﬂip side of the lending boom was large capital inﬂows to the bank-
ing sector. As we mentioned above, international borrowing ﬁnanced a
substantial share of bank lending in the early 1980s. After 1980, banks had
open access to international capital markets. With their funding base sud-
denly expanded, banks intermediated large volumes of foreign debt—all of
which was denominated in dollars. By regulation, banks were required to
match the currency composition of their liabilities with their assets, and
hence they lent sizable amounts to local ﬁrms in dollar-indexed debt. This
matching did not mean, however, that banks were not exposed to large sys-
temic risks due to currency exposure. It simply meant that the risk was
shifted to the corporate balance sheets. Banks traded currency risk for sys-
temic default risk. We return to the evidence on mismatch in section 6.7.
Even if they were aware of this risk, bank regulators had a limited abil-
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17. See Velasco (1991) for further discussion and additional references.ity to deal with it because of the existing exchange rate system. How could
banks set provisions or cap exposure for exchange rate risk if central bank
authorities (by ﬁxing the exchange rate) were committing to eliminating
this risk completely?
In the end, some combination of excessive idiosyncratic risk (due to
bank moral hazard) and systemic risk (due to large exchange rate expo-
sure) precipitated the ﬁnancial crisis. The interaction of a poor ﬁnancial
regulation and the systemic risk generated by a ﬁxed exchange rate was a
key determinant of this outcome.
6.5 Exchange Rate Regimes and International Borrowing
An interesting fact about the Chilean experience is that the large inﬂows
of 1996–97 occurred in the presence of massive reserve accumulation, a
commitment to a (relatively) stable exchange rate, and capital controls. As
discussed above, existing evidence indicated that capital controls did not
have a major impact on these inﬂows. In this section we turn to another as-
pect of the Chilean policy mix that we argue did play a central role in the
Chilean international borrowing experience: the exchange rate regime.
Standard approaches to international capital ﬂows assume risk neutral-
ity across the board and therefore focus exclusively on uncovered interest
parity (or the failure of it) as an explanation for capital movements. How-
ever, if borrowers in emerging markets are risk averse, then the decision
to borrow from abroad will depend not only on the expected interest rate
diﬀerential between domestic and foreign loans, but also on the variance
of debt service payments in the domestic currency. All else being equal, a
more volatile nominal exchange rate (or real exchange rate if the relevant
variance is of real peso values of debt payments) will make dollar borrow-
ing relatively less attractive to risk-averse local borrowers whose income is
denominated in the local currency. The role of the “currency mismatch”
implicit in this argument has received extensive attention in the recent lit-
erature on the balance sheet eﬀects of currency mismatches and their role
in recent ﬁnancial crises. Firms or consumers faced with a large deprecia-
tion and unhedged dollar liabilities experience a negative net worth shock,
which leads to lower output, investment, or consumption.18
All else being equal, we should expect ﬁrms and consumers to take these
balance sheet eﬀects into consideration when choosing the level and cur-
rency composition of their foreign debt. If currency composition is not a
choice, as is indeed the case for most emerging market economies (see
Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza 2004), then for a given expected in-
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18. Krugman (1999a, 1999b) presents a stylized version of this eﬀect, while Aghion, Bac-
chetta, and Banerjee (2001) and Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004) incorporate this mech-
anism into more fully articulated models.terest rate diﬀerential between foreign and domestic debt, the level of for-
eign debt will be decreasing in the expected variance of the exchange rate.
This implies that countries with credible ﬁxed or managed exchange
rates should, all else being equal, experience larger debt inﬂows. Further-
more, even if the ﬁxed exchange rate is not credible, it may still have a pos-
itive eﬀect on inﬂows if agents believe that an exchange rate precommit-
ment makes a government bailout in the case of a devaluation more likely
or prevents banking regulation from explicitly addressing exchange rate
risk. In the previous section we discussed how this might have operated in
the banking system in Chile in the early 1980s, where regulators had their
hands tied when it came to regulating the risks arising from dollar lending.
Similar concerns have been expressed for the case of Argentina, where dol-
larization also extended to domestic debt contracts. Beyond the banking
system, the preferential exchange rate agreements put in place after the
Chilean crisis in 1982 are one form of such a bailout: dollar-indebted ﬁrms
were allowed to buy discounted dollars with which to pay oﬀ their dollar
debts. If indeed ﬁrms in Chile in the early 1980s believed that the govern-
ment would bail them out in the event of depreciation, they were ultimately
proven right by the events that unfolded after the peg was abandoned.
In this section we want to test this hypothesis empirically so as to deter-
mine to what extent the exchange rate regime may have played an impor-
tant part in Chile’s international borrowing experience. However, the many
policies and external conditions prevailing in Chile at the time make it im-
possible to separate the eﬀects of the exchange rate regime from those of
capital controls on the evolution of capital inﬂows. Because of this, we es-
timate the eﬀects of capital controls and the exchange rate regime on capi-
tal inﬂows using cross-country regressions. We examine the period of large
capital inﬂows from 1991 to 1997 to explore the eﬀects of capital controls
and the exchange rate regime on the speed of inﬂows. Our dependent vari-
able is the increase in external debt. For this variable we use two measures:
the increase in the ratio of external debt to GDP and the rate of growth of
external debt.
We estimate regressions for the increase in debt on the exchange rate
regime and the extent of capital controls, and other control variables that
may aﬀect international borrowing. The other control variables are ex-
change rate volatility, the rate of growth of the economy, and the initial ra-
tio of external debt to GDP.
We compute the volatility of the exchange rate during the period, as the
volatility of the monthly exchange rate, to control for ﬂuctuations in the ex-
change rate. Perhaps what makes a diﬀerence regarding the volume of cap-
ital inﬂows is the actual ﬂuctuation of the exchange rate rather than the de-
clared exchange rate regime. A highly volatile exchange rate may prevent
investors from taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities to avoid losses
from exchange rate risk. However, from the point of view of expectations
264 Kevin Cowan and José De Gregorioof market participants it is essential to understand the logic of the author-
ities when intervening in the foreign exchange market, and hence volatility
could exacerbate ﬂows under the presumption that authorities will inter-
vene as a result of fear of ﬂoating. For this reason we still think that the
declared exchange rate regime is relevant. The impact of exchange rate
volatility on capital inﬂows is diﬀerent if volatility happens in a ﬁxed or
ﬂoating exchange rate regime.
Growth is clearly endogenous, and what should aﬀect the increase in
borrowing is the growth potential. For this reason, the predicted value of
growth for the period 1990–95 from cross-country growth regressions,
from De Gregorio and Lee (2004), was used as an exogenous variable. This
variable should proxy for the potential of the economy and, hence, for the
demand for international borrowing.
We also consider the initial level of external debt to GDP.19This variable
could have either a positive or a negative eﬀect on indebtedness. The nega-
tive eﬀect could come from the fact that a high initial level of debt may in-
dicate that the economy may be closer to a point where solvency could be
questioned, which could slow down the availability of debt. However, we
could observe a positive sign, when a large level of foreign debt may be a
signal that the country is less liquidity constrained, and so it has more
funds available to borrow.
To proxy for capital controls we use the index constructed by Chinn and
Ito (2002). This index is based on four dummy variables. One indicates
whether the country has multiple exchange rates; the second indicates the
existence of restrictions on current account transactions; the third is based
on restriction on capital accounts transactions; and the last one is based on
the requirement of the surrender of export receipts. The global index on
capital control intensity is the ﬁrst standardized principal component of
the four indexes. Chinn and Ito (2002) are interested in the eﬀects of ﬁnan-
cial integration, so their measure takes a higher value the more open the
country is to cross-border transactions; hence, this is an index increasing
in ﬁnancial integration. In contrast, we are interested in the extent of cap-
ital controls, and for this reason we multiply the Chinn-Ito index by –1 to
have an index increasing in capital controls. Therefore, we would expect
that when capital controls are eﬀective, an increase in the index (more con-
trols) should result in a decline of international borrowing, and hence the
coeﬃcient should be negative. We also used the proxy constructed by
Quinn (2003), and the results are basically the same, although in that case
we had fewer observations.
To control for the exchange rate regime we use the index constructed by
Levi Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). We consider their de jure and de facto
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19. We could also have controlled for initial GDP, as proposed by Lane (2004), but this is
in the growth forecast and also related to the initial level of debt.deﬁnitions for their three-way classiﬁcation (ﬁxed, managed, and ﬂoating).
To initiate our investigation we include the intermediate regime together
with the ﬁxed. Later on, we separate the three regimes.
We construct a cross section of countries with an initial sample of eighty
middle- and high-income countries, but because of data availability we
end up reporting regressions for twenty-six to ﬁfty-seven observations.
This will also help us check the robustness of the results to changes in the
sample.
The ﬁrst set of regressions is presented in table 6.4, where ﬁxed and man-
aged exchange rate regimes are put together. The dependent variable is the
change in the debt-output ratio. Regressions (1) to (4) present the de jure
classiﬁcation, and (5) to (8) the de facto one. The coeﬃcient on the ex-
change rate regime appears with a positive sign and is always signiﬁcant at
conventional signiﬁcance levels. This evidence conﬁrms that countries
with ﬁxed or managed exchange rate regimes experienced a larger increase
in external debt. The coeﬃcient on the volatility of the exchange rate is al-
ways not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Regarding capital controls, the coeﬃcient of the proxy for capital con-
trols is only marginally signiﬁcant, and with the wrong sign, when the ex-
change rate regime variable is based on the de facto classiﬁcation and the
growth forecast is excluded (regression [6]). The result could be due to cor-
relations between the exchange rate regime and the pervasiveness of capi-
tal controls. In fact, it is expected that the more controlled the exchange
rate regime is, the more likely is the prevalence of capital controls. How-
ever, the correlation between the de jure classiﬁcation and the index of cap-
ital controls is zero, and with the de facto classiﬁcation the correlation is
only 0.25 in our sample, so the insigniﬁcance of the capital controls vari-
able does not stem from the correlation of controls with the exchange rate
regime.
For the other two variables used in the regressions we found that growth
forecast has the expected sign, although it is insigniﬁcant in all the speciﬁ-
cations. On the other hand, the initial level of debt with respect to GDP is
negative, consistent with the idea that as debt increases borrowing con-
straints in international ﬁnancial markets may become more relevant.
As a ﬁnal check to examine whether the irrelevance of some variables is
due to possible correlations with the exchange rate regime, regression (9)
excluded the exchange rate regime altogether from the regression. As the
table shows, the insigniﬁcance of exchange rate volatility, capital controls,
and the growth forecast remains.
We run the same regressions for the percent change in external debt, and
the results are similar, although the exchange rate regime is not signiﬁcant
in some of the regressions. The problem may be due to the fact that the
ﬁxed exchange rate regime is classiﬁed together with the intermediate. For
this reason, in tables 6.5 and 6.6 we separate the three exchange rate































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































lregimes using dummy variables. Both tables report the same regressions,
and the only diﬀerence is in the dependent variable. Table 6.5 presents the
results for the change in the external debt–GDP ratio, and table 6.6 the re-
sults for the percent change of external debt.
The results are similar to those of table 6.4. The volatility of the exchange
rate and the growth forecast are generally insigniﬁcant. Capital controls
only appear marginally signiﬁcant in two regressions of table 6.5, and
again with the wrong sign. On the other hand, the ratio of initial external
debt to GDP is always negative and signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
The regressions show that external debt grew more in countries with
ﬁxed and managed exchange rates than in countries with ﬂexible exchange
rates. This is valid for the de jure and the de facto classiﬁcations, and for
the two alternative measures of the dependent variables, as can be seen in
both tables. These results also hold for the regressions that include all the
controls as well as those that only have the exchange rate regime, and there-
fore they hold for the more restricted sample of twenty-six observations
and the enlarged one with ﬁfty-six observations. The only exception is re-
gression (6) of table 6.6, where we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for
ﬁxed exchange rates, but inﬂows are larger in countries with a managed ex-
change rate than ﬂoating.
Moreover, an interesting result that appears in almost half of the regres-
sions is that the increase in debt is higher in countries with managed ex-
change rates than in countries with ﬂexible exchange rates. This can be seen
in the regressions that have a larger sample, (4), (5), (9), and (10) in both
tables, as well as (6)–(8) of table 6.6. In the more restricted sample, the
largest increase is in countries with a ﬁxed exchange rate. Although the re-
sults still conﬁrm that the lowest increase in debt is in countries with ﬂex-
ible exchange rates, the results are less deﬁnite when comparing ﬁxed ver-
sus managed exchange rates.
This last result may be explained by the fact that managed exchange rate
regimes may be, in some instances, more prone to investors’ speculating
against the exchange rate regime. As long as managed exchange rates, such
as the one in Chile in the 1990s, imply a limited defense on the exchange
rate, investors may speculate against the authority capabilities to defend
the currency, and hence the results should not be a surprise. This could lend
support to the bipolar view on exchange rate regimes, namely that it is
better to have fully ﬁxed or ﬂoating exchange rate regimes, and middle
grounds are dominated by the extremes.
Several other estimations were done to check robustness. First, as the de-
pendent variable we also used the average balance in the ﬁnancial account
over GDP during 1991–97, as well as the average change in net foreign as-
sets as reported by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001). The exchange rate
regime was never signiﬁcant. We interpret this as an indication that the
ﬂow that is actually aﬀected by the exchange rate regime is debt, rather
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cluding highly indebted countries and countries with less than $1,000 of
per capita GDP. These changes reduced the sample by between two and
four in the regressions with twenty-six observations and by up to ten ob-
servations in the enlarged sample. There were no changes in the results with
those modiﬁcations of the sample.
Overall, the international evidence reported here shows those countries
with ﬁxed and managed exchange rates are more prone to increases in ex-
ternal debt, and capital controls do not play a signiﬁcant role in reducing
debt inﬂows. The best way to prevent excessive borrowing is to let the ex-
change rate ﬂuctuate rather than to use capital controls. More work could
be done to check the robustness of our results, but the evidence presented
here is already very persuasive.
6.6 International Borrowing and Currency Mismatches
Much recent discussion has emphasized that the currency mismatches
that may arise from international borrowing are an important source of
international vulnerability. Firms and consumers holding dollar-
denominated debt but whose income is not highly correlated with the ex-
change rate see the local currency value of their debt expand relative to
their income and assets following depreciation. This deterioration in their
balance sheet reduces, or may even reverse, the expansionary eﬀect a de-
preciation is assumed to have. With this in mind, this section presents evi-
dence on the extent of currency mismatches in Chile in both the banking
and corporate sectors.
We start with data on currency mismatches in 1982. Figure 6.10 shows
the mismatch between assets and liabilities denominated in dollars in the
banking system. As expected, there were no mismatches in the early 1980s,
as regulation forced all domestic loans in dollars to be fully backed by lia-
bilities in dollars.20It is clear, therefore, that the currency mismatch that ex-
isted in the Chilean economy in 1982 was not on the balance sheets of the
banks but in the corporate sector.
There are no detailed data on currency mismatches in the corporate sec-
tor during this period. However, some sense of the existing currency im-
balances can be obtained by looking at the sectoral composition of the for-
eign currency lending of the banking system. That there was a currency
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20. In Chile regulation regarding currency exposure of the banking system is dictated by the
central bank. The ﬁrst change occurred with the debt crisis in August 1982, when banks were
allowed to have a maximum exposure to foreign currency of 20 percent of basic capital (cap-
ital plus reserves). Regulation has been basically the same until today. However, in August
1998 the global limit was maintained, but the computation of mismatches distinguished
among currencies. The weighting of each currency, which assigns factors of 1, 1.5, and 5, was
based on the risk classiﬁcation of countries of origin.mismatch problem in the corporate sector is evident in table 6.7. Consid-
ering the ﬁrst three sectors as tradable and the rest as nontradable, the ﬁg-
ures show that 53 percent of total loans in foreign currency went to non-
tradable sectors. We do not have information on the hedging practices of
corporations in Chile, but the large devaluation of June 1982 caused the
bankruptcy of the banking system, triggered by insolvencies at the corpo-
rate level.
Figure 6.10 shows that by the mid-1990s the total dollar value of foreign
currency exposure of banks increased. However, as ﬁgure 6.11 shows, the
magnitudes are small relative to total assets and therefore do not constitute
a major source of vulnerability in the banking system. On the whole, the
Chilean banking system of the late 1990s is not highly dollarized, a marked
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Fig. 6.10 Currency mismatch in the banking system
Sources: Herrera and Valdés (2004), Central Bank of Chile, and IFS.
Table 6.7 Financial system lending by sector in 1981 (in US$ millions)






Transportation and telecommunications 641 174
Financial services 4,744 453
Nonﬁnancial services 1,487 n.a.
Source: Arellano (1983).
Note: n.a.   not available.contrast with the early 1980s. In 1981, about 70 percent of total liabilities
were composed of dollar deposit and foreign debt. In contrast, in 2003 this
was only 24 percent, and regulation insured that mismatches were within
safe limits given banks’ levels of capitalization.
As we argue above, a large share of Chilean foreign debt is not interme-
diated by the banking sector but is held directly by ﬁrms. The picture
painted by the bank data in ﬁgures 6.10 and 6.11 may therefore provide a
partial view of total foreign debt in the economy. In addition, as we men-
tioned above, it is not dollar debt that matters for ﬁnancial vulnerability
but currency mismatches. It is therefore important to know not only how
much foreign debt there is, but also who holds the debt—in particular,
whether ﬁrms whose income is more correlated with the exchange rate are
those ﬁrms that hold higher foreign liabilities. To do this we turn to ﬁrm-
level data on the currency composition of ﬁrm liabilities.
Our data consist of ﬁrm-level accounting information for nonﬁnancial
corporations in Chile for the period 1993 to 2002. In addition, we have data
on ﬁrm exports and sectors in which the ﬁrms operate. Our main source of
information is the Ficha Estadistica Codiﬁcada y Uniforme (FECU) data-
base of the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (SVS).21 Data on the
currency composition of liabilities and assets are not recorded directly in
the FECU database but are reported in the notes attached to each ﬁrm’s
annual ﬁnancial statistics. These notes are neither standardized nor avail-
able in an electronic format. Because of this, we start with the data on for-
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Fig. 6.11 Composition of total liabilities in the banking sector
Sources: Herrera and Valdés (2004), Central Bank of Chile, and IFS.
21. The FECU database (available on request from the SVS) has standardized accounting
data for all ﬁrms categorized as Sociedades Anonimas Abiertas. By law these ﬁrms must dis-
close their accounting information using a standardized format (the FECU). We use non-
consolidated data, so that investments in subsidiaries are reported in a separate account and
not as a part of the aggregate stock of ﬁxed assets.eign currency liabilities assembled by Benavente, Johnson, and Morandé
(2003).22We then input data on foreign currency assets and derivatives col-
lected from each of the notes mentioned above.23 For our estimates, we use
a sample restricted to the nonﬁnancial ﬁrms for which foreign currency
data are available. The size of the sample changes as new ﬁrms are incor-
porated into the SVS database, but it consists of about 150 ﬁrms.
The distribution of dollar debt is presented in table 6.8, where we sepa-
rate the entire period in two subperiods: the 1993–98 period of managed
exchange rate and capital controls, and the 1999–2002 post–Asian crisis
period with ﬂexible exchange rate. The table shows that dollar debt is less
than 25 percent of total liabilities over 1993–98 and that this share declines
slightly in the second subperiod. The table also shows that ﬁrms (and/or
lenders) take into account the elasticity of their income to the real ex-
change rate when choosing currency composition of liabilities, as exporters
and ﬁrms in the tradable goods sector have a larger share of their liabilities
in dollar debt.
In addition, large ﬁrms also hold more dollar debt. This has three pos-
sible explanations: ﬁxed costs in accessing international capital markets,
the size restrictions mentioned in section 6.4, and lower costs of a mis-
match, since we would expect that large ﬁrms suﬀer less from ﬂuctuations
in their accounting net worth. Finally, ﬁrms that hold foreign assets, an-
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22. This database is part of a broader eﬀort by the IADB to put together data on ﬁrm-level
currency composition of liabilities. For more details see Galindo, Panizza, and Schiantarelli
(2003).
23. This data set is also used in Cowan, Hansen, and Herrera (2005).
Table 6.8 Distribution of dollar debt, 1993–2002
1993–1998 1999–2002
Dollar debt (% total liabilities)
Full sample 23.6 20.5
Nontradable sectors 13.9 12.8
Tradable sectors 34.3 29.2
No exporters (X   10% sales) 19.4 15.5
Exporters (X   10% sales) 47.7 42.4
Small ﬁrms (assets   median) 12.2 8.8
Big ﬁrms (assets   median) 35.0 32.1
No dollar assets ( 5% assets) 17.7 12.9
Dollar assets ( 5% assets) 51.6 45.8
Currency mismatch (% total assets)
Dollar debt 8.8 8.3
Dollar debt net of derivative position 8.5 7.0
Dollar debt net of derivative position 
and dollar assets 3.1 0.0
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SVS data.other proxy for the elasticity of income to the real exchange rate, hold more
dollar debt. Therefore, as expected or desired, ﬁrms that are less vulnerable
to exchange rate ﬂuctuations are also those that hold more dollar debt.
The ﬁnal panel of table 6.8 presents simple measures of currency mis-
match. Starting with the ratio of total dollar debt to total assets, we then
subtract the net currency derivative position of the ﬁrm, and then in turn
subtract dollar-indexed assets. Once assets and derivative positions are
considered, average currency mismatches for Chilean corporations are be-
low 5 percent of total assets in the ﬁrst period, and close to zero in the sec-
ond period.
Cowan, Hansen, and Herrera (2005) conﬁrm that it is this currency mis-
match—or exposure—that makes ﬁrms ﬁnancially vulnerable to a depre-
ciation and not dollar debt. Using ﬁrm-level data, they fail to ﬁnd a diﬀer-
ential eﬀect of depreciations on ﬁrms with higher levels of dollar debt in
Chile.24In other words, Chilean ﬁrms with higher dollar debt do not invest
less than their peso-indebted counterparts following depreciation. Cowan
and coauthors argue that this result does not invalidate the balance sheet
mechanism but that instead it shows the importance of using measures of
currency mismatch instead of debt measures to determine vulnerability. In-
deed, as we discussed above, the fact that Chilean corporations match the
currency composition of their liabilities with that of their incomes means
that negative balance sheet eﬀects are oﬀset by positive competitiveness
gains, so that dollar debt is a poor measure of mismatch.
The fact that even before the ﬂoating of the exchange rate and the elimi-
nation of capital controls currency mismatches in Chilean corporations
were minor lends support to the idea that ﬁrms had a prudent attitude to-
ward exchange rate changes even before the exchange rate was allowed to
ﬂoat. This suggests, in turn, that the exchange rate band did not provide
full implicit insurance to those holding unhedged foreign debt and that a
sharp exchange rate adjustment before 1999 would not have resulted in se-
rious ﬁnancial problems for the corporate sector. In addition, more instru-
ments to hedge currency exposure have become available to Chilean ﬁrms
since the peso started to ﬂoat, as the foreign exchange derivative market
has deepened signiﬁcantly (De Gregorio and Tokman 2004).
6.7 The United States–Chile Free Trade Agreement
Chile signed a free trade agreement with the United States in 2003. This
agreement involved some commitments in terms of capital ﬂows, and a rel-
evant issue is whether Chile could reimpose capital controls, in particular
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24. These are in line with previous results by Bleakley and Cowan (2002) for ﬁve Latin
American countries and with more recent results for eight East Asian economies by Lueng-
naruemitchai (2004).on inﬂows. The agreement’s chapter on ﬁnancial services considers the free
mobility of capital with no provisions. However, annex 10-C to the chapter
on investment establishes some margins to the application of capital con-
trols by establishing the legal actions that investors can take against
Chilean authorities in case of disputes regarding controls on capital move-
ments.25
In terms of capital controls on outﬂows, Chile has not used them since
the crisis of the 1980s, and even when pressures on the peso were at their
maximum in 1998 they were not used. But annex 10-C says that Chile will
not incur liabilities for costs arising from the imposition of restrictions on
outﬂows as long as they are not applied for more than a year and the re-
strictions do not “substantially impede transfers.” Therefore, restrictive
and focalized measures for up to a year are still possible. But the agreement
explicitly excludes transfers from FDI and external debt payments, as
agreed in the original terms of the loan, from the one-year restriction on
submitting claims.
The most relevant issue is restrictions on capital inﬂows. Investors may
take legal action when they are impeded from investing in Chile. However,
there are constraints on these actions. Chile should not be subject to claims
from losses incurred within one year from the date restrictions are im-
posed. The ﬁrst year can be applied along the same principles as outﬂows.
The treaty also establishes that a claim can be submitted only after one year
has elapsed from the loss incurred by the investor, which in fact would re-
sult in submission two years after the application of the restriction. In ad-
dition, the loss that can be claimed is limited to interest losses only, and no
other costs, such as loss of proﬁts or business. There is no class action, and
therefore all investors should submit claims independently. Therefore,
Chile could still impose capital controls on inﬂows, although for a shorter
period and with less freedom than in the 1990s.
However, the main limit to the application of capital controls in Chile
was their workings itself. In order to encourage domestic investors to invest
abroad during the application of the encaje, most investment abroad was
guaranteed the ability to return without having to pay the encaje. This
amount is large, and current estimates indicate that about $27 billion could
return free of encaje. Therefore, these investments have plenty of arbitrage
opportunities in case Chile reimposes the reserve requirement.
Therefore, Chile’s ability to apply capital controls is more limited than in
the past. In particular, the ability to impose controls for a year is more rel-
evant for outﬂows than inﬂows. The historical experience suggests that
transitory controls are more important to outﬂows, to prevent them dur-
ing a speculative attack, than to inﬂows, which require a longer-term ap-
plication. The limitations of Chile to impose capital controls is the com-
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25. This annex is reproduced in appendix B of this paper.bined result of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States and, more
important, the same regulations and guarantees granted during the period
of capital inﬂows. Regardless the feasibility of application of controls, the
relevant question is their desirability. In the case of Chile, the ﬁnancial sys-
tem is strong, there is a credible ﬂexible exchange rate regime—with mini-
mal reasons for fear of ﬂoating (De Gregorio and Tokman 2004)—and in-
ﬂation is low. Therefore, the arguments used to impose capital controls in
the 1990s are much less important today, and, in addition, as argued in this
paper, it is not clear that the controls were even eﬀective.
6.8 Why Did Chile Not Have a Sudden Stop?
Following the Asian-Russian crisis Chile experienced a sharp reversal in
net capital ﬂows, which has led many observers to use it as example of sud-
den stops in capital inﬂows. Total net inﬂows fell from over $6 billion in
1997 to $0.5 billion per year during 1999–2000. As seen in table 6.9, this
drop is comparable to, and in some cases larger than, that experienced by
other emerging economies that underwent capital account reversals during
the 1990s. These events raise the question of Chile’s external vulnerability.
Why, despite relatively low levels of foreign debt, low currency mismatches,
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Table 6.9 Sudden stops in emerging economies
  net inﬂows (% GDP) % explained by inﬂows
Argentina 1995 –6.0 64.0
Argentina 2001 –15.1 92.1
Colombia 1998 –6.9 95.6
Ecuador 1999 –48.3 84.8
Mexico 1995 –10.5 91.5
Peru 1997 –8.8 94.3
Indonesia 1998 –9.5 102.7
Korea 1998 –6.1 177.2
The Philippines 1997 –18.5 6.8
Thailand 1997 –19.8 100.3
Turkey 1994 –7.3 147.7
Turkey 1998 –11.4 103.8
Turkey 2001 –11.7 106.5
Average (no Chile) –13.8 97.5
Chile 1982 –24.5 109.3
Chile 1998 –7.6 –39.1
Sources: Authors’ construction based on IFS data. Sudden-stop episodes are from Calvo,
Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004).
Notes:   net inﬂows correspond to the diﬀerence between the maximum value of net inﬂows
in [t – 3, t] and the minimum value in [t, t   3], where t is the year of the sudden stop.   net in-
ﬂows are scaled by t – 1 (GDP).and relatively high levels of (allegedly) safe foreign direct investment, was
Chile vulnerable to a capital account reversal of this magnitude?
In this section we argue that the negative shock to the supply of interna-
tional capital played a minor role in the collapse of net capital ﬂows to
Chile. Indeed, the size of the international liquidity shock, the causes of the
adjustment, and the mechanism through which the diﬀerent shocks were
ampliﬁed set Chile apart from other emerging economies that experienced
sudden stops in the late 1990s. We argue that in Chile an initial large cur-
rent account deﬁcit, a sharp decline in the terms of trade, a contractionary
monetary policy, and the defense of the currency were the factors that trig-
gered the adjustment in capital ﬂows. In fact, Chile’s situation is better un-
derstood as a current account reversal combined with a sudden start in
capital outﬂows by domestic residents than a sudden stop in the inﬂows by
nonresidents.
The main lesson from this experience is (once again!) that consistent
macroeconomic policy matters, irrespective of the structure of gross for-
eign liabilities. As we documented above, despite controls on capital in-
ﬂows Chile had grown increasingly integrated into international capital
markets (a point also made recently by Milesi-Ferretti and Lane 2005). As
a consequence of this integration—and in much the same way as in Europe
in the early 1990s—inconsistent macro policy led to large net capital move-
ments despite the high share of “safe” FDI in Chilean international liabil-
ities. An additional lesson is that recent attention to the third-generation
currency crisis is justiﬁed by what happened in Asia, but not in Chile. In-
deed, as ﬁnancial integration increases, previous varieties of crisis may be-
come more likely in emerging market economies.
6.8.1 Sudden Stop or Sudden Start?
In the later part of the Asian-Russian crisis and its immediate aftermath,
the period 1998–99, net capital inﬂows to Chile dropped by close to 8 per-
cent of GDP. At the same time, the external ﬁnancing conditions for Chile
deteriorated, pushing up the cost of international borrowing. Figure 6.12
shows the spread between the returns on Chilean corporate and public
bonds and the rates on U.S. treasury bills. Between 1997 and 1999, the
spread on Chilean corporate bonds doubled. Data for public bonds sug-
gest a similar pattern for sovereign spreads. The timing of the rising spread
on Chilean bonds coincides with large hikes in the spread on bonds from
other emerging market economies, as measured by the spread aggregate
emerging markets bond index. The rise of corporate and sovereign spreads
in 1998, and their failure to drop to initial levels even after the current ac-
count deﬁcit was closed in 2000, is evidence that, along with many other
emerging markets, Chile experienced a negative shock to the supply of in-
ternational savings.
Despite similar patterns on spreads and the net capital account, Chile is
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1990s. The ﬁrst is in the level of country risk measured by the bond spreads.
Even at its peak, risk premia on Chilean corporate bonds was lower than
the average emerging market risk before the Asian crisis (see ﬁgure 6.12).
Moreover, there are episodes where the corporate bond spread has been
even higher, such as the second semester of 2002, and the domestic conse-
quences were much smaller than during the Asian-Russian crisis, addi-
tional evidence that the problem was not mainly with foreign lending but
with other factors.
Second, Chile ranks low in many of the variables that Calvo, Izquierdo,
and Mejía (2004) identify as determinants of sudden stops, a point made
originally by Calvo and Talvi (2005). According to Calvo, Izquierdo, and
Mejía (2004), sudden stops are usually the result of an international credit
shock that is ampliﬁed by the interaction between currency mismatches
and a real depreciation. Faced with restricted access to international
credit, currencies are forced to depreciate to close the gap between the cur-
rent and capital accounts, with the size of depreciation depending on the
relative size of the tradable sector. For those countries with large unhedged
foreign currency liabilities, this depreciation causes large negative balance
sheet eﬀects that amplify the initial shock and lead to further reductions in
output and expenditure. In Chile, dollar liabilities in the banking sector are
small, and the corporate sector is relatively well hedged, as shown in sec-
tion 6.6. Mismatches in the public sector are also small, even before in-
cluding copper revenues in the picture (Ministerio de Hacienda 2006).
The behavior of gross capital ﬂows sheds light on what was happening
with capital ﬂows in Chile at the time of the sudden stop. Figure 6.13shows
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Fig. 6.12 Spreads
Sources: Merrill Lynch and JPMorgan.
Note: Sovereign spread corresponds to EMBI global Chile.the path of gross inﬂows and outﬂows for Chile over 1996–2003. Following
the Asian-Russian crisis, total gross inﬂows into Chile actually increased,
while non-FDI gross inﬂows remained virtually unchanged. Gross out-
ﬂows, on the other hand, increased substantially, peaking at over $10 bil-
lion during 1999. There is no clear evidence that access to foreign capital
was curtailed, as gross outﬂows explain the bulk of the collapse in net in-
ﬂows.
The relative importance of gross inﬂows and outﬂows in the Chilean
episode is atypical within sudden-stop episodes in emerging economies.
The last column of table 6.9shows the share of the net capital reversal dur-
ing the sudden-stop episodes in emerging markets that is explained by
changes in gross inﬂows. In the average sudden-stop episode experienced
by emerging economies 98 percent of the net capital ﬂow reversal can be
explained by changes in gross inﬂows—that is, by stops or reversals in the
ﬂow of funds from nonresidents. Since inﬂows actually increased in Chile
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Fig. 6.13 Capital ﬂows: A, with FDI; B, net of FDI (ﬁnancial ﬂows)
Source: IFS.in 1998–99, the share explained by gross inﬂows is negative. Chile experi-
enced more of a sudden start in outﬂows than a sudden stop in inﬂows in
this period!
The behavior of two groups of institutional investors explains a large
share of the total gross outﬂows from Chile in this period: pension fund
management companies (AFPs) and banks.26 Pension funds increased the
share of foreign assets in their portfolio from close to 1 percent in 1997 to
above 10 percent in 1999. This corresponds to capital outﬂows on the or-
der of 5 percent of GDP. As this rising share of assets coincided with a
widening of the legal investment limits on foreign asset holdings for AFPs
it is hard to determine whether the outﬂow was driven by the macroeco-
nomic events of this period or was simply an easing of a binding regulatory
constraint.
The behavior of banks is more interesting. Banks contributed to capital
outﬂows by substantially increasing the share of foreign assets in their
portfolios. Starting from less than 1 percent in 1997, the ratio of foreign as-
sets to total assets peaked at over 6 percent in 1999 (ﬁgure 6.14). This cor-
responds to an outﬂow of close to 5 percent of GDP. As shown in the ﬁg-
ure, banks also increased their net dollar asset position over this period,
taking on more exchange rate risk. This suggests that these outﬂows were
not solely the response of banks looking to hedge rising dollar deposits. In-
terestingly, the share of foreign assets in total assets declined after the peso
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26. See Caballero (2002) and Caballero, Cowan, and Kearns (2005) for a more detailed dis-
cussion of this point.
Fig. 6.14 Bank assets and currency mismatches, foreign assets (% total assets)
Sources: Caballero, Cowan, and Kearns (2005), Bank Superintendency of Chile, and IFS.
Notes: Dollar assets were calculated as the sum of dollar-denominated loans and foreign as-
sets, and dollar liabilities as the sum of dollar-denominated deposits and foreign liabilities.
Foreign banks are those in which more than 50 percent of equity is owned by nonresidents.
Foreign assets are cash in foreign currency, oﬀshore deposits, and oﬀshore investments.was ﬂoated in 1999, but well before country risk returned to its precrisis
levels. Both the rising net asset position and the timing of the foreign asset
spike suggest that banks took on a net dollar position to take advantage of
arbitrage opportunities that arose prior to the currency being ﬂoated in
1999. In eﬀect, Chilean residents were betting against an exchange rate pol-
icy that tried to minimize depreciations, while in fact the large negative ex-
ternal shocks pushed the equilibrium real exchange rate upward. The po-
sition against the peso that was taken by banks and the fear of ﬂoating on
the part of the authorities induced the central bank to severely tighten liq-
uidity in the interbank market in 1998.27
Finally, the timing of events also sets Chile apart from countries that ex-
perienced sudden stops. The Chilean peso came under severe pressure in
January 1998. This led to an immediate monetary tightening, which suc-
cessfully fended oﬀ a depreciation (during 1998 the peso only depreciated
8 percent). The international liquidity shock, evident in the evolution of
spreads (ﬁgure 6.12), only began in July-August 1998. Therefore, in terms
of timing, the original shock came from the exchange rate and monetary
policy response.
6.8.2 Exchange Rate Policy
Following the Asian crisis in 1997 Chile’s terms of trade deteriorated sig-
niﬁcantly, pushing up the equilibrium real exchange rate. Concerned with
the eﬀects of a nominal depreciation on inﬂation, and the loss of credibil-
ity that this would entail if the ﬁxed annual inﬂation target was not met, the
Chilean central bank set out to minimize the nominal devaluation and rein
in nominal demand. To do so it implemented a contractionary monetary
policy (ﬁgure 6.15).28 In part the monetary contraction was also aimed at
closing a large current account deﬁcit. Since mid-1997 the current account
deﬁcit had been increasing, reaching a peak of about 8 percent of GDP in
1998, which authorities believed was unsustainable (ﬁgure 6.16). Simulta-
neously the Central Bank intervened in the foreign exchange market, sell-
ing close to $2 billion in reserves in 1998 alone.
The combination of a negative terms-of-trade shock, rising interna-
tional interest rates, and contractionary domestic monetary policy led to a
substantial slowdown in economic activity. Output growth fell from over 6
percent in 1997 and 1996 to 3 percent in 1998, and then it declined by 1 per-
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27. De Gregorio and Tokman (2004) argue that there were no reasons for fear of ﬂoating
since balance sheet eﬀects were not suﬃcient to cause serious ﬁnancial distress and the pass-
through from exchange rate to prices was relatively low to instill fear of an outburst of inﬂa-
tion.
28. These are monthly ﬁgures. Daily ﬁgures show more clearly the extent of the domestic
liquidity squeeze. In January 1998 rates went up to 100 percent in one day, and in July and
September it reached almost 60 percent. The ﬁgure shows up to July 2001, since until then the
policy interest rates, and most market rates, were set in terms of the UF (a Chilean unit of ac-
count indexed to the price level).cent in 1999. Simultaneously, unemployment rose from 5 percent to over
8 percent in 1999 (ﬁgure 6.17). As in the Obstfeld (1996) currency crisis
model (second generation), the rising output cost of the currency defense
pushed up depreciation expectations, which in turn made the defense of the
currency increasingly costly. This resulted in capital outﬂows of agents
(banks in particular!) wishing to cash in on arbitrage opportunities from
the gradual depreciations during 1998 and 1999. As we argued before, a
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Fig. 6.15 International reserves and interest rates 1996–2000
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
Fig. 6.16 Current account deﬁcit (% GDP)
Source: Central Bank of Chile.gradually appreciating exchange rate induces inﬂows. This experience re-
inforces that argument by showing that gradual depreciations promote
outﬂows. Capital outﬂows by the banks, the portfolio recomposition by
the AFPs, and a contractionary monetary policy all combined to generate
a severe credit crunch, depressing consumption and investment and lead-
ing to a large reduction in the current account.
Overall, the Chilean experience was the result of a reversal in the current
account, induced primarily by a very tight monetary policy and domestic
liquidity squeeze, a sharp decline in terms of trade, and a strong defense of
the peso. The pressures on the peso were caused by international turmoil
and a change in the equilibrium exchange rate of Chile, after the deterio-
ration of external conditions. In contrast, the international liquidity shock
that caused a sudden stop in many emerging markets played a secondary
role.
6.9 Conclusions
What then are the lessons from the Chilean experience with interna-
tional borrowing?
The ﬁrst is that domestic ﬁnancial regulations, in particular regarding
the ﬁnancial system, play a crucial role in determining the level and com-
position of capital inﬂows. Despite a more restrictive encaje in the early
1980s than in the 1990s, and regulations limiting bank balance sheet cur-
rency mismatches, poor regulation of the banking system in Chile led to
large inﬂows of debt, a substantial part of which was on-lent to the non-
tradable sector. The resulting corporate mismatch and additional prob-
lems such as asset concentration due to related lending and expectations of
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Fig. 6.17 Chilean GDP growth and unemployment rate
Source: Central Bank of Chile.bank bailout contributed to the deep ﬁnancial crisis that Chile experienced
in 1982.
The second, and perhaps more important, lesson is that the exchange
rate regime plays an important role in determining debt inﬂows, currency
mismatches, and ﬁnancial vulnerabilities. Fixed exchange rates, such as the
one Chile had between 1979 and 1982, provide an implicit guarantee to
borrowers and lenders alike. As long as the regime holds, borrowers and
lenders are protected from exchange rate volatility. If, on the other hand,
the currency depreciates, agents believe that they are entitled to transfers
and bailouts from the government, leading to excessive risk taking ex ante.
Ex post they have usually been proven right, as in the case of preferential
exchange rate deals in Chile or, more recently, the pesiﬁcation in Ar-
gentina. A ﬁxed exchange rate regime also makes it very complicated to in-
troduce prudential regulation for currency mismatches into banking leg-
islation. How can you ask banks to insure against an event you are
guaranteeing will never happen? But the real problem lies beyond banks,
and therefore policies must be consistent with incentives for corporations
to avoid excessive mismatches and banks for monitoring it, which requires
careful rules to regulate related lending and implicit massive guarantees on
the banking system.
More generally, rigidities in the exchange rate system may amplify
shocks to the supply of international capital. In good periods, a rigid ex-
change rate regime provides implicit insurance to borrowers, reducing the
risks of interest rate arbitration. The risk of postponing an adjustment—
that is, allowing the exchange rate to appreciate during a surge of capital
inﬂows—is an incentive for further capital to ﬂow in while assets still re-
main undervalued, putting additional pressures on an appreciation of the
currency. In bad periods, delaying depreciations ampliﬁes external shocks
by piling higher depreciation expectations onto an already higher risk pre-
mium.
Finally, the encaje played at most a small role in the size and nature of
debt inﬂows to Chile. Most studies show that it did have an eﬀect on the
maturity composition of inﬂows but that the magnitude of this eﬀect was
small. On the other hand, there is little evidence that it had a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on total inﬂows or on the real exchange rate. Moreover, the proper
functioning of restrictions, which attempted to deter ﬂows in and encour-
age ﬂows out, has its drawbacks. In the Chilean case there is an important
stock of investment that left the country when the encaje was in place, and
in order to encourage the outﬂow, they were insured to be able to return
without the imposition of controls, which limits the scope for restrictive
measures.
This paper also raises a series of additional issues regarding the Chilean
experience. The ﬁrst is the role of banks in intermediating capital inﬂows.
Up to 1999, banks in Chile intermediated very little international debt.
International Borrowing, Capital Controls, and the Exchange Rate 285Since 1999, this seems to be changing. One explanation for this is the en-
caje. An alternative explanation is the recent development of the deriva-
tives market, which allows banks to borrow abroad without burdening
themselves or their borrowers with currency risk. For the development of
this market in turn, the internationalization of pension funds and the
volatility that the ﬂexible exchange rate regime has brought have been very
important.
The second issue is currency mismatches. Using ﬁrm-level data for the
late 1990s we show that currency exposure in Chilean corporations was low
and that it fell after 1999. Bank-level data from 1982, on the other hand,
suggest that mismatches in the corporate sector prior to the crisis in 1983
were sizable. Again, the commitment to a ﬁxed exchange rate coupled with
weak regulation induces mismatches.
Third, Chile experienced a substantial slowdown in capital inﬂows in the
late 1990s. We argue that the exogenous international credit shock played
a minor role in this reversal. Most of the action came from a sudden start
of outﬂows, not from a sudden stop of inﬂows. Therefore, the Chilean case
is better described with second-generation currency crisis models than
with more recent models that center on balance sheet eﬀects. In Chile, a
negative terms-of-trade shock and an initially large current account deﬁcit
were ampliﬁed by a sharp tightening of monetary policy and an inconsis-
tent exchange rate policy. The current account reversal that took place was
accompanied not by a sudden stop of inﬂows in the capital account but by
a sudden start of outﬂows. Consistent with the fact that a gradually appre-
ciating currency encourages inﬂows, a gradually depreciating currency
promoted outﬂows.
Appendix A
Main Capital Controls and Exchange Regulations, 1990–2004
Unremunerated Reserve Requirement
1991 June
A 20 percent reserve requirement is applied to foreign loans. The reserve is for
a minimum period of ninety days and a maximum of one year. Prepayments
(merchandise must be shipped within six months) and charges are exempt.
1992 January
The 20 percent reserve requirement on foreign loans is extended to com-
mercial banks’ sight and term deposits in foreign currency.
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The reserve required is increased from 20 percent to 30 percent. The reserve
period for chapter XIV loans is uniformly set at one year, and, in the case of
banks, the days are counted as consecutive days instead of bank working
days. A liquidity credit line in dollars is established to constitute the reserve.
1995 July
Secondary ADRs and investments not destined for the formation or in-
crease of a local company’s social capital are now subject to a reserve re-
quirement in order to broaden the productive capacity of goods or ser-
vices, excluding straightforward ﬁnancial ﬂows.
1996 March
Foreign loans entirely destined for the prepayment of foreign loans that
were duly authorized and registered with the central bank are excluded
from the reserve requirement, while the weighted average terms of the new
loan and the remaining original loan remain similar.
September
The reserve required on ﬁrms’ foreign loans contracted by way of bond is-
sues is eliminated when the ﬁnancing thus obtained is to ﬁnance investment
abroad or to reﬁnance liabilities of the ﬁrm’s agents or aﬃliates abroad.
October
A reserve is established for portfolio investment made according to the stipu-
lations of chapter XIV of the Compendium of Foreign Exchange Regulations
(CNCI) even when this investment is to constitute or increase the capital of
ﬁrms already established in the country if it is not made to increase produc-
tive capacity of goods and services or to contribute to the ﬁrms’ productive
operation. The reserve requirement is still excepted in the case of investment
made to acquire ﬁrst-issue shares on the grounds of an ADR convention.
December
Loans, capital contributions, and investment for amounts less than
US$200,000 are exempt from the reserve requirements, but the same agent
must not have exceeded US$500,000 in the past twelve months. This mea-
sure is eliminated in 1997.
1998 June
The reserve rate on foreign loans, capital contributions, and investment is
lowered from 30 percent to 10 percent for the ﬁrst year. Short-term banking
system liabilities (credit lines and the public’s cash deposits) remain subject
to the 30 percent reserve, but two-thirds of the reserve will be remunerated.
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The reserve requirement is lifted from capital inﬂows destined for ADR ar-
bitrage transactions in the secondary market.
September
The exchange reserve is reduced to zero on all capital inﬂows. At the same
time, the reserve rate on foreign currency sight and term deposits and loans
is reduced to make the reserve cost in foreign currency the same as in local
currency.
2001 April
The 0 percent reserve requirement on incoming capital is eliminated.
Loans, Investment, and Capital Contributions from Abroad
1993 April
The minimum period that capital contributions entering Chile under the
stipulations of chapter XIV of the CNCI must remain in the country is re-
duced from three years to one year.
2000 May
The minimum period of one year that investments and capital contribu-
tions must remain in the country, as stipulated in chapter XIV of the
CNCI, is eliminated.
2001 April
The capital account is completely freed by eliminating all remaining re-
strictions but keeping the requirement that ﬁnancial-type exchange trans-
actions must be channeled through the formal exchange market and the
central bank informed of those exchange operations that it decides. Con-
sequently, prior authorization is no longer needed for capital inﬂows asso-
ciated with foreign loans, investment, and capital contributions, the same
as for capital outﬂows associated with capital returns, dividends, and other
beneﬁts relating to capital contributions and investments and prepayments
of foreign loans. The obligation of selling and/or buying foreign currency
on the formal exchange market is also eliminated, as well as the restrictions
on the currency in which foreign loans may be granted or taken.
2002 January
Financing obtained from foreign loans, investments, and capital contribu-
tions may be freely used abroad, including the capitalization of any out-
standing debt abroad.
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More simple requirements are set regarding information on all exchange
matters regulated by the CNCI.
Bond Issues Abroad
1992 May
Residents in Chile are authorized to obtain foreign loans by placing bonds
abroad. Bond issuers must have an A rating from the Risk Classifying
Commission of the pension fund administrators.
1994 April
Solvency levels required for banks and nonbanking companies are lowered
to BBB and BBB , respectively. Moreover, nonbanking companies’ mini-
mum amount requirement is lowered from US$50 million to US$25 mil-
lion, stays at US$50 million for banks, and the need for the central bank’s
express authorization is eliminated.
1995 November
Funding obtained from bond issues abroad no longer has to be brought
back to Chile. It can be held in a bank account abroad and used to pay back
foreign loans or imports that have been approved and registered with the
central bank, or it can be invested in foreign instruments abroad.
1998 April
Minimum amount requirements for bond issues abroad are eliminated,
and the required international risk classiﬁcation of the issuing company is
lowered. The weighted average term of subordinated bond issues made by
banking companies is lowered from ten to ﬁve years to come into line with
the new Bank Act. The issue of bonds abroad denominated in Chilean pe-
sos or in UF is authorized, but these cannot be traded or oﬀered in Chile
and must be disbursable and payable in foreign currency.
1998 June
Funding generated by bond issues, under the stipulations of chapter XIV,
can be put to wider uses, thereby allowing for the issue of bonds for infra-
structure.
1999 April
Nonbanking debtors can issue bonds at maturities of less than four years,
and the risk classiﬁcation required for longer-term bonds is lowered.
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Bonds denominated in Chilean pesos or in UF can now be accepted as li-
abilities payable in foreign currency. Interest paid on these bonds is thus
subject to the same tax rate as traditional bonds denominated in foreign
currency (4 percent).
2001 April
Capital inﬂows obtained from bond issues are no longer restricted by re-
quirements of prior authorization. Also, the requirements of minimum
risk classiﬁcation of the issuing company and minimum weighted term of
the bond issues are eliminated.
ADR Issues
1990 April
ADR trading is introduced by which residents abroad can acquire shares
in Chilean corporations. Companies must meet requirements with respect
to the minimum amount of the issue and risk classiﬁcation of the ﬁrm, dif-
ferentiating between banking and nonbanking companies.
1998 April
The minimum amount requirement for issuing ADRs is eliminated, and
the minimum level of international risk classiﬁcation is lowered.
August
To simplify capital movements, the reserve requirement on incoming
capital for ADR arbitrage operations in the secondary market is elimi-
nated.
2000 April
Chapter XXVI of the CNCI is broadened to allow securities to be issued in
stock exchanges abroad by way of instruments other than the ADRs on the
New York Stock Exchange. It also allows company development funds and
real estate investment funds to issue quotas abroad.
2001 April
Restrictions on ADR issues are eliminated.
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1991 April
To widen investment opportunities, individuals’ own foreign currency or
currency that they have acquired on the informal exchange market can now
be invested abroad, the central bank being duly informed.29
1997 April
Regulation on Chilean residents’ investment abroad is changed, mainly in
that (a) prior authorization is no longer required, (b) investment permitted
abroad of foreign currency acquired through the formal exchange market
is widened to include granting loans and buying physical assets, and (c) re-
mittances must be made through the formal exchange market with the due
central bank notiﬁcation.
1998 June
The investment options abroad for foreign currency not acquired on the
formal exchange market are now the same as those authorized for foreign
currency acquired on the formal exchange market.
1999 November
Chapter XII of the CNCI is modiﬁed to contain the regulation on for-
eign currency remittances or availability of funding for amounts over
US$10,000 or the equivalent in other currencies.
2001 April
All remaining restrictions are eliminated, but transactions must still be carried
out through the formal exchange market and reported to the central bank.
Exchange Regulations on Institutional Investors
1992 January
Pension fund administrators (AFPs) are allowed to invest a maximum of
1.5 percent of the total value of the fund in securities approved by the Risk
Classifying Commission. This limit is gradually increased until, in January
1999, it reaches 16 percent and the limit on investment in variable-income
instruments is 10 percent. At the same time, the minimum risk classiﬁca-
tion of the investment instruments is also gradually lowered.
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29. The law distinguishes between “formal” and “informal” foreign exchange markets. The
formal market is constituted by banks, and the rest comprises the informal sector. The main
diﬀerence has been only the information requirements.1994 November
Insurance companies are authorized to invest abroad in ﬁnancial invest-
ments (10 percent of their resources in the case of life insurers and 15 per-
cent in the case of general insurers) and in nonresidential urban property
(up to 3 percent). Mutual funds are also allowed to invest abroad (up to 30
percent of their resources).
1996 October
Mutual funds are authorized to invest abroad using foreign currency ob-
tained in the formal exchange market, and the 30 percent limit is increased
to 100 percent of their total assets.
1999 February
Insurance companies’ limit on ﬁnancial investment abroad is increased
from 15 percent to 20 percent in the case of general insurers and from 10
percent to 15 percent in the case of life insurers.
2003 May
The limit on AFPs’ investment abroad is raised to 25 percent; in 2004 it is
raised again to 30 percent.
Appendix B
Annex 10-C of the Free Trade Agreement 
between Chile and the United States
Special Dispute Settlement Provisions: Chile
1. Where a claimant submits a claim alleging that Chile has breached an
obligation under Section A, other than Article 10.3, that arises from its
imposition of restrictive measures with regard to payments and trans-
fers, Section B shall apply except as modiﬁed below:
(a) A claimant may submit any such claim only after one year has
elapsed since the events giving rise to the claim;
(b) If the claim is submitted under Article 10.15(a)(b), the claimant
may, on behalf of the enterprise, only seek damages with respect to
the shares of the enterprise for which the claimant has a beneﬁcial
interest;
(c) Loss or damages arising from restrictive measures on capital in-
ﬂows shall be limited to the reduction in value of the transfers and
shall exclude loss of proﬁts or business and any similar consequen-
tial or incidental damages;
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i(i) transfers of proceeds of foreign direct investment by investors
of the United States, excluding external debt ﬁnancing covered
in subparagraph (d)(ii), and excluding investments designed
with the purpose of gaining direct or indirect access to the ﬁ-
nancial market; or
(ii) payments pursuant to a loan or bond issued in a foreign mar-
ket, including inter- and intra-company debt ﬁnancing between
aﬃliated enterprises made exclusively for the conduct, opera-
tion, management, or expansion of such aﬃliated enterprises,
provided that these payments are made in accordance with the
maturity date agreed on in the loan or bond agreement;
(e) Excluding restrictive measures referred to in paragraph 1(d), Chile
shall incur no liability, and shall not be subject to claims, for dam-
ages arising from its imposition of restrictive measures with regard
to payments and transfers that were incurred within one year from
the date on which the restrictions were imposed, provided that such
restrictive measures do not substantially impede transfers;
(f) A restrictive measure of Chile with regard to payments and trans-
fers that is consistent with this Annex shall be deemed not to con-
travene Article 10.2 provided that, as required under existing
Chilean law, it does not discriminate among investors that enter into
transactions of the same nature; and
(g) Claims arising from Chile’s imposition of restrictive measures with
regard to payments and transfers shall not be subject to Article
10.24 unless Chile consents.
2. The United States may not request the establishment of an arbitral
panel under Chapter Twenty-Two (Dispute Settlement) relating to
Chile’s imposition of restrictive measures with regard to payments and
transfers until one year has elapsed since the events giving rise to the dis-
pute.
3. Restrictive measures on payments and transfers related to claims under
this Annex shall otherwise be subject to applicable domestic law.
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